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AN ILL-STARRED DECISION-LAMBERT
v. YELLOWLEY*
F ORREST REVERE BLACK t

I

One of the most interesting and perplexing, constitutional problems
that has been brought into the limelight by the advent of national
prohibition is the nature and scope of the respective police powers
of the nation and the states under the Eighteenth Amendment.
No case decided by the Supreme C6urt of the United States furnishes a better basis for the discussion than Lambert v. Yellowley,'
decided November 29, 1926.
The Supreme Court, by a five to four decision, held that the provision of the National Prohibition Act3 that "Not more than a pint
of spirituous liquor to be taken internally shall be prescribed for
use by the same person within any period of ten days and no prescription shall be filled more than once" is appropriate legislation within
the meaning of the Eighteenth Amendment. The pertinent words
of the Amendment are: ". .. . the manufacture, sale, transportation
importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors.... for beverage
purposes is hereby prohibited." Certain limitations are inherent
in the Amendment: (a) limitations as to'relationship: manufacture,
sale, importation, exportation, and transportation; (b) limitations
as to purpose: for beverage purposes. In prohibiting the use of
intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, it does not prohibit, or
delegate the power to prohibit, medicinal, industrial, or sacramental
uses. The second section of the Amendment contains two other
limitations as to the method of enforcement: (a) by appropriate
legislation and (b) by concurrent power.
Before analyzing in detail the decision of the majority it is first
necessary to present the statutory provisions relating to the case.
Section 7 of the National Prohibition Act 4 provides, "No one but a
*Thisis one of a series of articles which the author will publish under the general
caption of "Ill-Starred Prohibition Cases".
tProfessor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1272 U. S. 581, 47 Sup. Ct. 210 (1926).
2

Decision by Brandeis, J. Sutherland, McReynolds, Butler, and Stone, J.J..

dissented. In the district court Judge Knox had held the act unconstitutional
in Lambert v. Yellowley, 291 Fed. 640 (S.D. N. Y. 1923). The circuit court of
appeals reversed the district court in 4 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). The same
statute had been declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in another
case, U. S. v. Freund, 29o Fed. 411 (D. Mont. 1923).
3
Act of Oct. 28, i919, c. 85, tit. 2; 41 STAT. 311; 27 U. S. C. A. § 17 (1927).
4

-bid.
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physician holding a permit to prescribe liquor shall issue any prescription for liquor.... Not more than a pint of spirituous liquor
to be taken internally shall be prescribed for use by the same person
within any period of ten days and no prescription shall be filled more
than once." Section 2 of the supplemental act of November 23, 1921,6
provides that "No physician shall prescribe, nor shall any person
sell or furnish on any prescription, any vinous liquor that contains
more than 24 per centurn of alcohol by volume, nor shall anyone
prescribe or sell or furnish on any prescription more than one-fourth
of one gallon of vinous liquor, or any such vinous or spirituous
liquor that contains separately or in the aggregate more than onehalf pint of alcohol, for use by any person within any period of ten
days." Under these statutes the maximum quantity of spirituous
liquor which may be prescribed within any period of ten days to
any one person is one pint, but that pint must not contain more
than one-half pint of alcohol. Neither of the acts purports to regulate the use for beverage purposes of spirituous liquors lawfully
possessed, nor do they prohibit the giving of advice by any person
in respect to such use or the quantities to be used. Further, neither
of the acts purports to regulate the use of lawfully possessed spirituous liquors for medicinal purposes, otherwise than under physicians
prescriptions, nor to regulate the giving of advice in regard to such
use, except in the case of physicians' prescriptions.
Secondly, by way of background it should be noted that the
American Medical Association, representing the physicians of the
United States, is not agreed as to the therapeutic value of intoxicating liquors. At its meeting in 1917 it declared that the use of alcoholic
liquor as a therapeutic agent was without "scientific basis" and
"should be discouraged", and at its meeting in June 1921 it adopted
a resolution saying that "reproach has been brought upon the
medical profession by some of its members who have misused the
law which permits the prescription of alcohol." But in 1924 at
the Chicago meeting the House of Delegates, representing the ninety
thousand members of the American Medical Association as its
official body, unanimously voted a resolution condemning those
portions of the National Prohibition Acts "which interfere with the
proper relation between the physician and his patient in prescribing alcohol medicinally."16 And the same Association filed in the case
at bar a brief as amicus curiae vigorously challenging the Act now
under review as arbitrary and unreasonable. From this conflicting
5
Act
6

of Nov. 23, 1921, c. 134, § 2; 42 STAT. 222; 27 U. S. C. A. § 18
Supra note I, at 591, 47 Sup. Ct. at 212; (1924) 82 J. A. M. A. 2o56.

(1927).
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evidence, it seems fair to conclude with Mr. Justice Sutherland "that
the question is of a highly controversial character; and, since it
reasonably cannot be doubted that it is a fairly debatable one, the
legislative finding, necessarily implicit in the Act, that vinous and
7
spirituous liquors are of medicinal value, must be accepted here."
Finally, by way of introduction to the case itself, the plaintiff,
Dr. Lambert, an eminent New York physician, did not intend to
prescribe the use of liquor for beverage purposes. He alleges that
it is his opinion, based on experience, observation, and medical
study, that the use of spirituous liquors as medicine is, in certain
cases, necessary in order to afford relief from known ailments, and
that in the use of such liquors as medicine in certain cases, including
some now under his observation and subject to his professional
advice, it is necessary, in order to afford relief, that more than one
pint of such liquor in ten days be used internally, and in certain
cases, it is necessary that it be used without delay, notwithstanding
that within a preceding period of less than ten days one pint of such
liquor has already been used. He further alleges that in prescribing
drugs and medicines the determination of the quantity involves a
consideration of the physical condition of the patient and their
probable effect in each specific case. As the two Actp set out above
make a violation a crime, subjecting the offender to fine or imprisonment or both, the plaintiff, Dr. Lambert, seeks to enjoin Yellowley,
a prohibition director, from interfering with his acts as a physician
in prescribing vinous or spirituous liquors to his patients for medicinal
purposes in quantities exceeding the limits fixed by the National
Prohibition Acts. Thus the constitutionality of the measures is
clearly placed in issue before the Court.
8
The majority opinion rests chiefly upon Everard'sBreweries v. Day .
This case deals with the constitutionality of a Congressional act
prohibiting the prescription of malt liquor for medicinal purposes.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in the case at bar said , "We have spoken of
that case at length because the decision was by a unanimous court
and if adhered to disposes of the present case. If Congress may
prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating malt liquor for
medicinal purposes by way of enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment,
it equally and to the same end may restrict the prescription of other
intoxicating liquor for medicinal purposes. In point of power there
is no difference; if in point of expediency there is a difference, that
is a matter which Congress alone may consider."
7

Supra note i, at 600, 47 Sup. Ct. at 215.

8265 U. S. 545, 44 Sup. Ct. 628 (1924).
9

Supra note I, at 594, 47 Sup. Ct. at 213.
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There are, however, three important distinctions between the
Everardcase and the case at bar that destroy its value as a precedent.
(i) The Everard case presented the constitutional question from the
standpoint of a manufacturer. Whatever incidental right to practice
medicine might be said to have been involved was remote. Mr. Justice Holmes in Quong Wing v. Kirkendall'0 declared, "Laws frequently are enforced which the court recognizes as possibly or probably
invalid, if attacked by a different interest or in a different way."
It is well established that "the direct control of medical practice
in the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government.""
In Linder v. United States1" the Court said, "Congress cannot, under
the pretext of executing delegated powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Federal Government."
Federal power is delegated and its prescribed limits must not be transcended even though the end seems desirable. Congress cannot
directly restrict the professional judgment of the physician or interfere with its free exercise in the treatment of disease. Whatever
power exists in that respect belongs to the states exclusively.
(2) In the Everard case the court held that the question of the
reasonable necessity of the prohibition of malt liquor was in reality
a question of fact. It had been so handled. After exhaustive hearings, Congress acting upon a report of one of its committees declared
by statute that the prescription of malt liquor should be prohibited
because the evidence was overwhelming to the effect that malt
liquors had no substantial medicinal value. But the same Congress
acting on the report of the same committee permitted physicians
to prescribe vinous and spirituous liquors for medicinal purposes.
In the Everard case the court said 3 , "We find, on the whole, no ground
for disturbing the determination of Congress on the question of fact
as to the reasonable necessity, in the enforcement of the Eighteenth
Amendment, of prohibiting prescriptions of intoxicating malt
liquors for medicinal purposes." And so here the legislative finding,
implicit in the statute now under review, to the contrary effect in
respect of vinous and spirituous liquors, likewise should be accepted
as controlling, and the Everard case rejected as inapplicable.
(3)The third distinction is that Congress never investigated
the question of fact as to the reasonableness of the regulation attached to the prescription of vinous and spirituous liquors for medicU. S. 59, 64, 32 Sup. Ct. 192, 193 (1912).
S., 268 U. S. 5, x8, 45 Sup. Ct. 446, 449
"Ibid. 17, 45 Sup. Ct. at 449.
"Supra note 8, at 563, 44 Sup. Ct. at 633.
10223

"Linder v. U.
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inal purposes. Mr. Justice Sutherland says14, "The report of the
committee and the hearings will be searched in vain to find any suggestion that the quantity designated by the statute is adequate
or that the committee or Congress gave any consideration to that
question. The only fact in this record bearing upon that subject
is the allegation, under oath, of the appellant that in his professional
opinion, based on experience, observation and medical study, more
than that quantity, in certain cases, including some under his own
observation and advice, is necessary. And, certainly, there is no
basis for asserting the contrary in any fact or circumstance to be
found outside the record of which this Court can take judicial notice."
' The Act in the case at bar recognizes the necessity of vinous and
spirituous liquors for medicinal purposes, but prohibits in many
cases the efficacy of the remedy. It sets up an absolute maximum
of one pint in ten days. There are no exceptions or qualifications.
If, on the ninth day, the patient should take a sudden turn for the
worse, or an entirely new ailment should intervene, making another
prescription essential to prevent death, the doctor must violate
either his conscience or the law.
The position of the dissent on this point is convincing. Mr.
Justice Sutherland says 5, "The naked question, then, simply comes
to this: Conceding these liquors to be valuable medicines, has Congress power, under the constitutional provision prohibiting traffic
in intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, to limit their prescription in good faith, and consequently their necessary use, for medicinal
purposes, to a quantity which, under the allegations taken as true,
is inadequate for such purposes? To me the answer seems plain. If
Congress cannot altogether prohibit the prescription for medicinal
use, it cannot limit the prescription to an inadequate quantity, for,
obviously, in that case, to the extent of the inadequacy, the prohibition is as complete, and the usurpation of power as clear, as though
the prohibition were unqualified."
II
The second step in the development of the majority's opinion
raises the interesting constitutional question as to the nature of
the police power of the federal government under the Eighteenth
Amendment. Is it as broad as the police power of the states over
intoxicating liquor? Can a decision dealing with the state police
power be cited as a controlling precedent for national police power?
"Supra note r, at 6oi, 47 Sup. Ct. at 216.
lI.1W.

602,

47 Sup. Ct. at 216.
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The late Wayne B. Wheeler in his brief filed as amicus curiae in the
Lambert case pointed out that seven states had absolutely prohibited
the prescription of any kind of intoxicating liquor for medicinal
purposes; that in three states prescriptions could be made only
if the liquor was made unfit for beverage purposes; in fifteen states
only alcohol could be prescribed; in three states no more than a
specified quantity of intoxicating liquor fit for beverage purposes
could be prescribed. He concluded that, since some of the state
restrictions which were more stringent than those in the Congressional Act had been upheld by the courts, there was therefore no
question as to the validity of the Act in the case at bar.
Is this a valid argument? What are the assumptions on which it
is based, and where will it lead if accepted by the courts? This
position is well stated by a legal writer16 substantially as follows:
The Eighteenth Amendment conferred permanently upon the
federal government the same power to deal with intoxicating liquors
which had hitherto been exercised and was still retained by the
states as part of their police power. By the permission to exercise
concurrent power the state retains unimpaired the inherent police
power to restrict the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquors which they had enjoyed before. Since "concurrent"
connotes a "like" power, it is this police power of the states which
was thereby transferred to the federal government. In short, each
state, together with the federal government, exercises the same power
to deal with intoxicants which hitherto belonged to the states alone.
What implications inhere in this statement of constitutional
theory? (x) It is well established that the Federal Bill of Rights
does not constitute a limitation on the powers of the states. It
limits only the federal government1 7 . Now if the Eighteenth Amendment has transferred to the federal government the same power
that the states previously possessed, then the federal power under
the Eighteenth Amendment is not limited by the Federal Bill of
Rights. Under such a theory Congress can provide for ruthless and
barbaric methods of search and seizure, since the Fourth Amendment no longer limits the national government in prohibition matters;
it can abolish jury trial and the privilege against self-incrimination
and can punish anyone who advocates a repeal of the present prohibition law. (2) But it may be said that the same guarantees are
found in state constitutions that are found in the Federal Bill of
16johnson, Some Constitutional Aspects of Prohibition Enforcement (1924) 97
L. J. 113.
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833).

CENT.
17
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Rights. This is not strictly accurate. An examination of state
constitutions will reveal that state bills of rights are not identical.
Such being the case, state police power as limited by state constitutional provisions is not identical in the forty-eight commonwealths.
It follows from this that if the states transferred to the federal government the power that they previously had, since the power in each
state was not identical with that in every other state, then they did
not transfer one definite and certain power but several diverse powers,
and hence under this theory Congress would with difculty be able
to exercise a uniform power throughout the entire country.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in speaking for the majority of the Court
in Lambert v. Yellowley undoubtedly recognized the absurdity of the
theory,18 but several places in the argument he skirts dangerously
near an acceptance of it. In reading the decision one expects all
along that the learned judge will finally commit himself and definitely
declare that the police power of the national government over intoxicating liquors is the same as the police power of the states. But
he is too wary for that. The result is that he expounds a theory
which is so indefinite that, coming from a court of last resort, it is
actually dangerous.
At this point we desire to indicate the two places in the argument
where Mr. Justice Brandeis comes perilously near an acceptance
of the theory. He declares19 , "The Federal Government inenforcing
prohibition is confronted with difficulties similar to those encountered
by the States", and again, "When the United States exerts any of
the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, no valid objection
can be based on the fact that such exercise may be attended by some
or all of the incidents which attend the exercise by a State of its
police power." The latter portion of the statement is a paraphrase
from the case of Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse
Co. 20 , a prohibition decision, handed down by Mr. Justice Brandeis

before the Eighteenth Amendment and based on the war power.
In this earlier case he was challenged by the same problem and
flirted with it in the same evasive manner.
Two excerpts from that decision will suffice to reveal his attitude.
(i) "That the United States lacks the police power, and that this
was reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, is true. But
18One federal district court swallowed the theory whole without perhaps realizing its dangerous implications. Ex parte Crookshank, 269 Fed. 98o (S. D. Calif.
1921).

19Supra note I, at 594, 596, 47 Sup. Ct. at 213, 214.
20251 U. S.146, 4o Sup. Ct. lO6 (i919).
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it is none the less true that when the United States exerts any of
the powers conferred" upon it by the Constitution, no valid objection
can be based upon the fact that such exercise may be attended by
the same incidents which attend the exercise by a State of its police
power, or that it may tend to accomplish a similar purpose. ' ' 2 Ia The
weasel word here is the word "conferred". Does it mean by express
provision, or does it mean by implication? If it means the latter,
must the validity of the implication be determined by some test
other than the test of state police power?
(2) Another illustration of arguing in a circle is found in the following statement from the same case: 22 "If the nature and conditions of
a restriction upon the use or disposition of property is such that a
State could, under the police power, impose it consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment without maldng compensation, then the
United States may for a permitted purpose22a impose a like restriction consistently with the Fifth Amendment without making compensation." What is a "permitted purpose"? Is the test to be furnished by an application of state police power, doctrine, or is it to
be determined by some independent test? Mr. Justice Brandeis
does not enlighten us.
III
The Lambert case also raises in a striking manner the further
query, Are there limitations on the doctrine of implied powers?
The fact- should never be forgotten that the state police power is
reserved, undefined, and residual, while the basis of federal police
power is delegated, enumerated, and circumscribed. While it is
difficult to formulate the limitationsP on the national police power,
it is believed that the three principles following must be adhered to
in order to have a valid exercise thereof.
(i) Congress must use an enumerated power. There must always
be a constitutional peg as a basis for the implication. It is not necessary that the implied power be traced to some single express provision.
It is sufficient if the implication can be drawn from two or more
express provisions considered cumulatively. This is known as a
"resulting power".2 But this is to be distinguished from a general,
21

2
MSupra note 20, at i56,40 Sup. Ct. at io8.
2aItalics are the writer's.
The best treatment of the nature and scope of national police power will be
found in a series of articles by Robert E. Cushman in (I919) 3 MINN. L. Rnv.
289, 381, 452 and (1920) 4 MINN. L. REV. 247, 402.
24
Examples of resulting powers are: the power to issue legal tender or notes,
Julliard v. Greenman, 1iO U. S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. 122 (1884); the power to exclude

Italics are the writer's.

221W4.
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inherent, unenumerated power. The Constitution merely confers
on Congress the right to exercise powers incidental to enumerated
powers, if necessary and proper; any other theory would strip the
states of all their powers, for if each implied incidental power breeds
new powers by added implication, there is no point at which the
process can be halted, and the result must in time be one consolidated
government in place of our present federal system.
(2) The second limitation on the national police power is that
there must be a real relevancy between the regulation attempted
and the constitutional peg (or pegs) upon which it is hung, and (3)
the third is that the act must not infringe upon other express constitutional limitations, especially the Bill of Rights.
The Eighteenth Amendment is specifically aimed at intoxicating
liquor for beverage purposes. Note how the Court in the Lambert
case tries to blur the distinction between beverage and medicinal
uses in the following quotati6n 6 : "High medical authority being
in conflict as to the medicinal value of spirituous and vinous liquors
taken as a beverage2 , it would, indeed, be strange if Congress lacked
the power to determine that the necessities of the liquor problem
require a limitation of permissible prescriptions, as by keeping the
quantity that may be prescribed within limits which will minimize
the temptation to resort to prescriptions as pretexts for obtaining
liquor for beverage purposes." It is submitted that the words
"taken as a beverage" are misleading. If the court meant "taken
internally", why not say so? The physicians of the country were
not asked by any Congressional investigating committee concerning
their views as to the "medicinal value of intoxicating liquor taken as
a beverage". How then does the Court know that "high medical
authority is in conflict" on this question?
In i8oo, Thomas Jefferson, in protesting against a Congressional
act to incorporate a company to work copper mines in New Jersey,
said27, "Ships are necessary for defense. Copper is necessary for
ships. Mines are necessary for copper. A company is necessary
to work the mines, and who can doubt this reasoning who has ever
played at 'This is the house that Jack built'? Under such a process
of filiation of necessities, the sweeping clause makes clean work."
aliens, Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. ioi6 (1893); the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367 (1875).
25
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 411 (1819); I FORD, JEFFERSON
(1892) 44; 3 HAWILTON'S WORKS (Lodge's ed. 1885) 192; I CONG. DEBATES 1899;
22 ANNALS OF CONG. 212.

26

Supra note I, at 597, 47 Sup. Ct. at 214.
'aItalics are the writer's.
2710 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Bergh's ed. 1907) 165.
2
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Strange to relate, our Congress and Supreme Court have accepted
this very philosophy in the prohibition cases. In the Lambert case
Congress has gone far beyond the beverage class. The Lambert
doctrine works as follows: A is ill; he is to be deprived of needed
medicine' in order to prevent B from quenching his thirst. Because
some medicinal alcohol may get into beverage channels, the federal
politician and the reformer and the judge attempt to elbow the
competent physician from the bedside of his bona fide patient.
Following the same line of reasoning, the Supreme Court in the
Selzman case, 28 which is cited with approval in the case at bar, holds
that Congress has power to prevent or regulate the sale of denatured
alcohol which is not usable as a beverage. Here Congress invades
the field of industrial alcohol to protect "the ignorance of some"
and "the cravings and hardihood of others" and to frustrate the
"fraud and cupidity of still others". The Federal Oil Conservation
Board has reported that the total amount of petroleum in known
fields in the United States would at the present rate of consumption
last for only six years. 29 At present there are three possible substitutes for gasoline: shale oil, methanol, and ordinary alcohol. Experts
agree that the latter is the most efficient and practicable. Congress
and the Supreme Court in their endeavor to make prohibition effective
may cripple the industrial and defensive power of the nation.
If Congress can go outside the beverage class, it can also go outside the intoxicating class. It can prohibit the manufacture of cider
and fruit juices. If it can prohibit something which through natural
processes of fermentation may ultimately become intoxicating, it
can also regulate and prohibit non-intoxicating beverages that look
like intoxicating liquor. It may be properly mentioned as a reductio
ad absurdum that water looks like gin!
If in order to enforce the prohibition of intoxicating liquors effectively, Congress can prohibit the sale of non-intoxicating beverages,
then why may not a second implied power ° engender a third, under
which Congress may forbid the planting of barley or hops and the
manufacture of barrels or kegs? The mischievous consequences of
such reasoning were long ago pointed out in Kidd v. Pearson1 ,
where in reply to a suggestion that under the expressly granted
power to regulate commerce Congress might control related matters,
28

Selzman v. U. S., 268 U. S. 466, 45 Sup. Ct. 574 (1925).

48 NEw REPUBLIC 82.
See dissent in Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141

29(1926)
30

McReynolds, J. Van Devanter, Day, and Clark, J.J., also dissented.
31X28 U. S. I, 21, 9 Sup. Ct. 6, i0 (1888).

(1920)
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it was said, "The result would be that Congress would be invested,
to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only
manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising,
domestic fisheries, mining-in short every branch of human industry. For is there one of them that does not contemplate, more or less
clearly, an interstate or foreign market?"
In these post-Volsteadian days, insofar as the "noble experiment"
is concerned, both Congress and the Supreme Court have laid on
the shelf the old-fashioned but thoroughly sound John Marshall
doctrine of implied powers. In the glorious drive toward the great
objective, they have accepted the philosophy (f "this is the house
that Jack built". The game may be intriguing to the players, but
sooner or later the spectators will challenge their government by
asking an embarrassing question, Shall there be two constitutions,
one for prohibition and one for all other matters whatsoever? Does
it require a seer to predict what the ultimate answer will be?

